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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jennifer Shaw challenged the district court's denial of her motion to suppress on 
appeal. She contends that the evidence does not support a finding that there was 
probable cause to support a warrantless search of the vehicle she was driving. 
Specifically, she contends that the purported alert by the canine unit (Max) was not 
reliable because the officer was forcing the dog to perform the sniff from a location 
where the dog had poor footing, even though, according to the officer, Max is noticeably 
apprehensive (i.e., less reliable) in conditions where his footing is poor. Furthermore, 
the officer's testimony as to Max's training only indicates he would smell where his 
human counterpart indicated he should smell. His record in the field, situations where 
the officer would not already know where the drugs were located, was far less 
promising, as the officer noted that Max would alert fairly frequently when drugs were 
not present. 
Furthermore, the officer's testimony only revealed that he believed the dog was 
trying to alert, not that the dog had actually alerted; instead, the dog slipped into the 
storm drain on which the officer had made him stand. Additionally, when the officer 
directed Max back to that same area of the car to try again, Max did not alert. As such, 
the particular circumstances of this case reveal that Max's behavior was not sufficient to 
generate probable cause to justify a warrantless search. The State simply contends 
that, despite these facts, Max's alert should be deemed sufficient to search the car 
without a warrant. Since the factual findings underlying that conclusion are clearly 
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erroneous and demonstrate that Max was not, in this particular circumstance, reliable, 
those arguments should be rejected and the evidence should be suppressed 
Ms. Shaw also contends that the inventory exception, which had been forwarded 
as a justification below, was inapplicable. The State did not further that argument on 
appeal, and, therefore, any response in that regard should be considered waived. In 
fact, the State's response only addresses the automobile exception. As such, if this 
Court determines there was not probable cause to support the warrantless search under 
the automobile exception, it should reverse the district court's decision without 
considering any of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement. After all, the State 
bears the burden of demonstrating such exceptions are applicable, and it has not done 
so. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Ms. Shaw's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES IN REPLY 
1. Whether the State is mistaken in asserting that there was sufficient information to 
support the district court's finding that there was probable cause to warrantlessly 
search the vehicle based on Max's purported alert. 
2. Whether the State's decision to not argue for the application of any other warrant 




The State Is Mistaken In Asserting That There Was Sufficient Information To Support 
The District Court's Finding That There Was Probable Cause To Warrantlessly Search 
The Vehicle Based On Max's Purported Alert 
The United States Supreme Court recently clarified that, even if a canine unit is 
generally reliable, "[the] circumstances surrounding a particular alert may undermine the 
case for probable cause-if, say, the officer cued the dog (consciously or not), or if the 
team was working under unfamiliar conditions." Florida v. Harris, _ U.S. _, 133 
S. Ct. 1050, 1059 (2013). The State contends that there was sufficient evidence upon 
which to find probable cause to support a warrantless search of the car pursuant to the 
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. (Resp. Br., pp.4-16.) It is mistaken 
because, even if this dog is generally reliable, the circumstances surrounding this 
particular event undermine the case for probable cause. Compare Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 
1059. This time, Max was on unsure footing (where he is more apprehensive and less 
reliable than he is generally), and the evidence suggests that he responds only to cues 
from his human handler. Both of those factors undermine the case for probable cause 
in this instance. See id. 
In fact, the officer's testimony reveals that Max never actually alerted on the car -
only that his handler claimed that he attempted to alert. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.4-10.) 
Nevertheless, the State asserts that Max did actually alert on the car. (See, e.g., Resp. 
Br., p.7.) As the testimony clearly reveals, Max did not actually alert, he only 
purportedly tried to do so. (Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.4-10.) Therefore, the State's assertion in 
this regard is belied by the testimony of Officer Vogt. Furthermore, the evidence does 
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not even support the assertion that Max was trying to alert. This particular dog is known 
to be skittish when his footing is poor: "he's very, very apprehensive about slick-looking 
floors, tile floors, painted concrete, stuff like that. ... [He will] do what he's supposed to 
do ... [but y]ou can tell he's not as confident on those types of footing issues .... " 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.27, ls.4-17.) Basically, the officer testified that Max will be concerned with 
his footing while trying to do what the officer wants him to do. The reasonable inference 
from that testimony is that, where Max is on unsure footing, he will divert his attention 
from the task at hand to ensure stable footing, and as such, be less reliable in 
performing the task at hand. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.27, Ls.6-9 (testifying that Max 
behaves differently when his footing is unsure, hugging the walls (maintaining his 
footing) rather than behave normally).) In this case, Max's footing was unsure 
demonstrated by the fact that he actually lost his footing and slipped into the storm 
drain. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.31, Ls.5-17.) Therefore, the evidence suggests that Max was 
less reliable in any attempts to alert to detected odors. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.27, ls.4-17.) 
Nevertheless, the State argues that Max's response at the gas tank of the car was 
definite and justifies the warrantless search. (See Resp. Br., pp.4-16.) That argument 
ignores the United States Supreme Court's recent discussion of such cases - that 
circumstances such as this detract from the determination that probable cause exists. 
See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1059. Therefore, the State's argument in this regard is 
unavailing. 
Furthermore, Officer Vogt testified that he had Max return to the same area of the 
car where he had purportedly attempted to alert, to give him a second chance to alert. 
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.31, L.23 - p.32, L.3.) This suggests that Officer Vogt was not at all 
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confident that Max had actually attempted to alert when he slipped into the storm drain. 
More to the point, Max did not alert or attempt to alert on the car, given that opportunity 
to try again. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.31, L.23 - p.32, L.3.) This fact is ignored by the State. 
(See generally Resp. Br.) A dog's failure to alert after making a purported alert is a 
factor that should be considered as weighing against a finding of probable cause. See 
State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 707 (2012) ( citing various other cases holding the 
same, though also reaffirming that an alert from a reliable dog on the vehicle is itself 
sufficient to generate probable cause). In this case, where it is not even clear that the 
dog ever alerted (as opposed to tried to keep sure footing when the officer had him 
stand on a storm drain), the case for probable cause is more substantially weakened 
than in those cases cited in Anderson. Compare id. This further demonstrates that, 
given the particular circumstances in this case, there was insufficient evidence to make 
the determination that Max had actually and reliably alerted on the vehicle. Compare 
Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1059. As such, the evidence in this case does not support a 
determination that there was probable cause to search the vehicle without a warrant. 
Compare id.; Anderson 154 Idaho at 708. 
The State also erroneously contends that Max is generally reliable when it 
comes to identifying narcotics. (Resp. Br. pp.14-16.) For example, it relies on Max's 
performance in controlled environments as evidence of his overall reliability, discounting 
the fact that Officer Vogt testified that Max will "fairly frequently" alert when no drugs are 
present. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) The United States Supreme Court's recent 
decision on this matter belies the State's position: a dog's tendency to alert when no 
drugs are present is a factor which impacts its reliability. See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1057. 
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"Indeed, evidence of the dog's (or handler's) history in the field, although susceptible to 
the kind of misinterpretation we have discussed,1 may sometimes be relevant .... " Id. 
As such, the evidence reveals that Max is not the paragon of reliability that Aldo (the 
dog from Harris) was determined to be. Compare Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058-59. Max is 
known to be less reliable in the field, and is known to be particularly apprehensive in 
performing when he is on unsure footing, yet the State is asserting that his actions in 
those very conditions are clear enough to justify the warrantless search. 
In a final effort to try and rehabilitate Max's reliability in this situation, the State 
points to part of Officer Vogt's testimony relating to the manner in which he trained Max. 
(Resp. Br., pp.15-16 (relying on Tr., Vol.1, p.22, Ls.8-15).) It asserts that, because Max 
was able to locate places where Officer Vogt had hidden samples of drugs, that Max's 
training reveals him to be reliable. (Resp. Br., pp.15-16 (relying on Tr., Vol.1, p.22, 
Ls.8-15).) It is mistaken. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Harris, a 
dog's alert may be deemed unreliable if it is responding to cues from its officer 
companion, whether those cues are conscious or unconscious. Harris, 133 S. Ct at 
1059. Officer Vogt testified that Max's initial training was based entirely on his cues to 
the dog: that he would have Max smell a box known to contain a sample of a drug, and 
then the officer would give Max his ball. (Tr., Vol.1, p.21, Ls.22-24.) According to 
Officer Vogt, all Max cared about was getting the ball. (Tr., Vol.1, p.22, Ls.2-3.) As 
1 The Court had discussed the idea of false alerts in situations where the drugs are too 
well hidden to find or where residual odor remains. See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056. 
However, all the Court stated in this regard is that the dog's record in the field is not "the 
gold standard." Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056. It did not, as the State claims (see Resp. 
Br., at pp.14-15), discount or disregard the canine's performance in the field as 
evidence to be considered in the ultimate determination of whether probable cause has 
arisen in a given scenario. Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1056-58. 
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such, Officer Vogt's testimony reveals that Max was essentially trained to sniff where 
Officer Vogt indicated, so that he would get his ball. (See Tr., Vol.1, p.21, L.22 - p.22, 
L.3.) 
This underlying premise of Max's training does not change simply because 
Officer Vogt changed the location of the drug sample he wanted Max to locate. Officer 
Vogt testified that he would place samples of the drugs in various locations and have 
Max find them. (Tr., Vol.1, p.22, Ls.8-15.) In that scenario, Officer Vogt still knows 
where the drugs are, meaning he would be capable of cuing Max (consciously or 
unconsciously) as to whether he was sniffing in the right location. Since, as Officer Vogt 
testified, Max was essentially trained to sniff where Officer Vogt indicated, that 
testimony suggests Max was still sniffing where Officer Vogt indicated, rather than 
reliably locating the drugs himself. See Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058 (describing blind 
testing, where neither the canine nor the officer know where the drugs have been 
hidden to eliminate potential cuing as a variable in the dog's performance). As such, 
the evidence presented reveals that Max's training record does not demonstrate him to 
be as reliable as he might seem at first glance. As a result, his purported alert in this 
case is even less reliable. 
The result of all this evidence is that the district court erroneously determined that 
Max made a reliable alert in this case. (See App. Br., pp.7-12.) Because Max's 
purported alert was not reliable, given the particular training methods used, his less-
than-stellar field record, and the particular circumstances surrounding this purported 
alert, it was not sufficient to provide the officers with probable cause to warrantlessly 
search the vehicle. Compare Harris, 133 S. Ct. at 1058-59; Anderson, 154 Idaho at 
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708. As such, this Court should reverse the district court's decision to deny Ms. Shaw's 
motion to suppress. 
IL 
The State's Decision To Not Argue For The Application Of Any Other Warrant Exception 
Should Constitute A Wavier Of Such Arguments 
In her Appellant's Brief, Ms. Shaw addressed the assertion, discussed in the 
district court (see, e.g., Tr., Vol.1, p.13, L.24 - p.14, L.3; R., pp.72-78), of whether the 
inventory exception might also justify the search of the vehicle. (See App. Br., pp.12-
14.) The State did not address that issue in its Respondent's Brief. (See generally 
Resp. Br.) If a party wishes an issue to be considered on appeal, it must provide 
argument and authority in support of that issue, or else, that argument will be 
considered waived. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996). The State bears the 
burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement is applicable in any 
given case. See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302 (2007); see also Mincey v. 
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (the United States Supreme Court unanimously 
holding that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable). Therefore, since the State 
has not forwarded any argument in that regard, contentions that any other exception to 
the warrant requirement (specifically the inventory exception) may be applicable should 
be considered to be waived, since the State has offered no argument in that regard, 
thereby failing to meet its burden in that regard. 
As a result, if this Court determines that the automobile exception is inapplicable 
in this case, it should reverse the district court's order and suppress the evidence found 
in the car. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ms. Shaw respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of conviction, 
reverse the district court's order denying her motion to suppress, and remand her case 
for further proceedings. 
DATED this 19th day of August, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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